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Eugene Thomas Long
Lord Gifford and his Lectures: The First Year (1888-1889)

During the academic session, 1888-1889, the first
Gifford Lectures in natural theology were delivered at
three of the then four Scottish Universities, Edinburgh,
Glasgow and Saint Andrews. During the following year the
first Aberdeen lectures were given. Now one hundred years
and more than 150 lecturers later, the Gifford Lectures are
recognized by many as the most distinguished lecture series
in the world. Lecturers have come from many different fields
as the names James Frazer, Werner Heisenberg, Arnold Toynbee,
Albert Schv,pitzer, Josiah Royce and Rudolf Bultmann suggest
and most of the lectures have been published.
Some of the published versions of the lectures such as
William James' The Varieties 0/ Religious Experience and
Alfred North Whitehead's Process and Reality have become
classics in the field of natural theology. Many of the
lecturers have been intent on advancing the field of natural
theology. Others such as the philosopher A.J. Ayer and the
theologian Karl Barth have been mainly critical of the
enterprise of natural theology. Some of the lectures .lay now
be looked upon as period pieces. Many, however, represent
important contributions to the field and the Gifford

26

Eugene Thomas Long

Lectures have helped keep the subject alive when the whole
concept of natural theology was being challenged by both
philosophers and theologians.
The Gifford Lectures were established by the will of
Lord Adam Gifford, an Edinburgh solicitor and judge, who at
his death in 1887 bequeathed the sum of 80,000 pounds for
lectureships in natural theology at the four Scottish
universities.
Although in ancient times, natural theology
tended to be contrasted with civil theology, more typically
natural theology is contrasted with revealed theology. In
both cases, however, natural theology refers to general
reflection on religion independent of appeals to special
revelation or the authority of a particular history or
tradition. One might say that in the broadest sense natural
theology attempts to build bridges between secular and
religious views of self and world.
Gifford was neither a philosopher nor a theologian, but
he did display a keen interest in intellectual questions
about religion and lectured to various literary and
philosophical societies on topics ranging from Ralph Waldo
Emerson to Jurisprudence to Hinduism. He read ancient and
modern philosophy as well as poetry and while suffering from
paralysis during the last seven years of his life, he was
absorbed in the study of western and non-western systems of
philosophy and religion. He made no secret of the fact that
his studies had led him to surrender some beliefs which he
had been reared to consider essential to Christian faith.
His own attitudes towards religion are summarized in one of
his papers on Emerson where he writes:
The truth is, that although in education and
elsewhere we may try to separate secular from sacred,
and provide time-tables and conscience clauses and so
on, religion will not be separated from anything
whatever. It will penetrate every cranny and pervade
every space, and it will flow around and through every
su b ject and every su bstance like electricity.l
That Gifford was interested in drawing connections
between ordinary and scientific views of the world on the
one hand and religious views on the other is manifested in
the directions that he gave for the establishment of the
lectures. According to his will, natural theology was to be
conceived in the widest sense. The lecturers were directed
to "treat their subject as a strictly natural science, the
greatest of all possible sciences, indeed, in one sense the
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only science, that of Infinite Being, without reference to
or reliance upon any supposed exceptional or so-called
miraculous revelation." Further the lecturers were not to be
subjected to any test of belief. The lecturers could be of
any denomination or of none; they could be religious or of
no religion. It was only required that they be "able,
reverent men, true thinkers, sincere lovers of and earnest
inquirers after truth." The lectures were also to be public
and open to the whole community.
At the time of the first Gifford Lectures, natural
theology in Great Britain generally referred to the
traditional arguments for the existence of God as
exemplified in the work of William Paley. But developments
in the empirical sciences and in the empirical type of
philosophy which dominated British thought in the eighteenth
and well into the nineteenth centuries had called natural
theology in this form into question. The latter part of the
eighteenth century and the first three quarters of the
nineteenth century were dominated by empirical and
scientific attitudes arising from scientific research and
philosophical discussions of the nature of knowledge. The
work of such scientists as John Dalton, Michael Faraday, and
John Joule had resulted in a new and more comprehensive
vision of the material world. And the work of Lamark, Darwin
and others emphasized the natural development of the species
from more primitive forms.
The idea of evolution, as is well known, was not unique
to Darwin. Indeed, one year prior to the publication of
Origin of the Species, the philosopher, Herbert Spencer, had
drawn up a plan for A System of Synthetic Philosophy based
on the idea of progress or evolution. But it was the
extensive research of Darwin that gave empirical grounding
to the theory of evolution and the work of Huxley brought
evolutionary theory to the attention of the general public.
Because of such developments which tended to lend support to
materialistic theories of reality, it became increasingly
difficult during the second half of the nineteenth century
to find a place for the world of the spiritual. Herbert
Spencer attempted to do sO,but his more positivistic frame
of mind could make a place for the spiritual only in the
realm of the unknowable.
Empirical methodologies, however, were not limited to
the sciences. Following the Protestant revolution and its
challenge of the authority of the Church in religious
matters, the Bible, understood as the infallible and
essentially self-interpreting revelation of divine truth,
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had become for many the final authority in religious
matters. This belief survived into the eighteenth century
until it was challenged by historical and critical
approaches to the Biblical textS.In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, first on the continent and then in
Britain, Biblical scholars challenged some of the factual
claims of the Biblical texts, pointed to parallel texts in
other traditions, showed that many texts were written and
edited later than had been supposed, and pointed to
inconsistencies in the Biblical record. In 1860, controversy
was created in England when some Anglican churchmen argued
in Essays and Reviews that the Bible should be treated as any
other book. And the 1875 edition of Encyclopedia Britannica
carried an article by the Scottish Free Church scholar, W.
Roberston Smith, arguing a similar theme. Smith and other
Scottish Biblical scholars were thoroughly familar with
Biblical scholarship on the continent but this article
brought this to the attention of the general public. Smith
was tried for heresy and in 1881 was dismissed from his
Chair at Aberdeen.
Concurrent with the development of the historical and
critical approach to the Biblical sources was a rapid growth
in the knowledge of other cultures and religions resulting
from philosophical, historical and anthropological studies.
Stimulated by the idea of human evolution and challenges to
the Biblical story of creation, attention was given to the
scientific description and interpretation of various peoples
and cultures and this led to increased awareness of diverse
religious traditions. Efforts were made to trace
historically the evolution of religious concepts and
comparisons were drawn between the Judaeo-Christian and the
so-called primitive religions. These studies often
challenged Christian claims to uniqueness and authority. It
is no accident that among the early Gifford lecturers were
several anthropologists and historians of religion.
The empirical philosophy of Locke, Berkeley and Hume had
for the most part dominated British philosophy in the
eighteenth and well into the nineteenth centuries, John
Stuart Mill being its leading nineteenth century
representative. This approach to philosophy often presented
challenges to natural and revealed theology. John Locke had
divided ideas into two kinds, sensation and reflection. The
ideas of sensation were said to come through the senses and
the ideas of reflection were derived from the mind's
observations of its own operations on ideas presented in
sensation. This meant that all ideas are derived from the
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senses and these ideas were said to be caused by things
external to the mind. Ideas stand for or represent things
existing in the world.
Bishop Berkeley argued that Locke's position separated
ideas from the reality of things and that this led to
scepticism about our perception or understanding of real
things in ordinary as well as religious knowledge. The way
to overcome this scepticism said Berkeley was to accept that
what we know are our ideas and that what we call an object
is actually an idea or a collection of ideas. Things exist
in their being perceived. According to Berkeley, Locke's
speaking of objects independent of our ideas of objects could
only lead to confusion and meaningless claims since
ultimately Locke's objects are unknown and unknowable. The
Scottish philosopher, David Hume, was to take this position
even further arguing that on Locke's view there was also no
reason for accepting belief in an independent mind. Hume's
well known Dialogues on Natural Religion also called
into question the traditional arguments for the existence of
God and challenged much that had been treated under the
heading of natural theology.
The Scottish School of Common Sense represented best by
Thomas Reid was seen by many to offer an alternative to the
subjective idealism of Berkeley and the empirical scepticism
of Hume and the tendency of both to separate self from world
and God. On Reid's account we cannot prove, but nevertheless
are forced to believe by the constitution of our nature that
what we perceive are things existing independently of mind.
On the same grounds, he argued, we are forced to believe in
self-identity and other minds. To deny these beliefs is to
engage in the absurd. Although Reid did not hold that these
beliefs depended on belief in God, he did maintain that the
explanation of our common sense beliefs depended upon our
nature being constituted by God. Reid's position places great
weight on belief in a fundamental constituition of ourselves
and did not satisfy many who sought a more secure
foundation for overcoming the sceptical tendencies of the
age. Another Scot, Sir William Hamilton, sought to overcome
some of the problems in Reid's thought but his Kantian
emphasis upon the Absolute as unknowable placed even more
burden upon belief and in the eyes of some led to another
form of scepticism.
At the time of the first Gifford Lectures then, many of
the intellectual supports for religious faith seemed to have
been called into question and scepticism was a dominant
mood. Consciousness of self appeared to be divorced from
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consciousness of the external world. Religious consciousness
or consciousness of the Infinite was divorced from
consciousness of the finite and the religious was divorced
from the secular. The older traditon of natural theology had
been called into Question by Hume, Kant and others and the
prospects for natural theology seemed dim. However, some new
intellectual forces were in the wind in Scotland and we get
some insight into these forces in the first year of the
Gifford Lectures.
Of the first Gifford Lecturers, two were Scots, Andrew
Lang being among them. 2
Lang was born in 1844 in Selkirk
and spent his earliest years reading folk tales and roaming
the hills in the borderlands of Scotland. Said to be
somewhat bookish in nature, he was sent at age ten to the
Edinburgh Academy and in 1861 he enrolled in Saint Andrews
University. Along the way he read among others the works of
Scott, Pope, Dickens, and Longfellow. After reading Homer
he also developed an intense interest in classical learning
and in his later years he translated the Iliad and the
Odyssey and published several books on Homer. Early in 1863
he left Saint Andrews for Glasgow University where he hoped
to Qualify for a Snell Exhibition at Balliol College,
Oxford. This goal was achieved and in the Michaelmas term of
1864, he matriculated at Balliol. The idealist philosopher,
T.H. Green, served as Lang's tutor and Lang developed a deep
respect and affection for the classical scholar, Benjamin
Jowett, which lasted long after Lang left Oxford.
Little is known about Lang's seven years at Merton
College where he was elected a Probationer in 1868 but
records show that he was reading anthropology as well as
literature. Lang was particularly attracted to the
anthropological work of Edward Burnett Tylor although in his
Gifford Lectures he would challenge Tylor's claim that
animism was the foundation from which all religion
developed. In 1875 Lang moved to London to follow a
journalistic career and he spent the remainder of his life
there.
Andrew Lang wrote on many diverse subjects representing
his wide range of interests. In addition to many reviews,
essays and poems, Lang was a pioneer in comparative
anthropology, a field that at this time was for the most
part investigated outside the realm of university supported
subjects. Lang's approach to anthropology was less
scientific in the strict sense and was rooted in literature
and folklore, an interest that can be traced back to his
boyhood days in Selkirk. He was a founder and early
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president of the Folk-Lore Society but he was also a
founding member of the Society for Psychical Research, an
organization that counted among its members many leading
philosophers and psychologists. These two interests,
anthropology and psychical research , form the immediate
background to his Gifford Lectures delivered at Saint
Andrews during the 1888-1889 academic session.
Much of Lang's work in anthropology was of a polemical
nature and his Gifford Lectures continue in that tradition.
In the published version of his lectures, The Making of
Religion, he begins by summarizing the conclusion which he
says is presented by the field of the History of Religions
with an air of authority:
Man derived the conception of 'spirit' or 'soul'
from his reflections on the phenomena of sleep, dreams,
death, shadows, and from the experience of trances and
hallucinations. Worshipping first the departed souls of
his kindred, man later extended the doctrine of
spiritual beings in many directions. Ghosts, or other
spiritual existences fashioned in the same lines,
prospered till they became gods. Finally, as the result
of a variety of processes, one of these gods became
supreme, and, at last was regarded as the one only
God. Meanwhile man retained his belief in the existence
of his own soul, surviving after the death of the body,
and so reached the conception of immortality. Thus the
ideas of God and of the soul are the result of early
fallacious reasonings about misunderstood
experiences. S
Lang's Gifford Lectures challenged the received wisdom
of the History of Religions on two accounts. First he calls
into question the materialistic conception of reality which
he believed to dominate much of the work in this field. By a
method of comparing the customs and manners of civilized
races with those of so-called primitive or savage races, he
attempts to show that such supernormal experiences as
clairvoyance, thought transference, and telepathy cannot be
easily dismissed as mere fables. These kinds of
experiences;he argues, may represent just the kind of facts
on which the primitive doctrine of soul may be based.
Second, by collecting and comparing accounts of the high
gods and creative beings believed in by most primitive
tribes, Lang challenges the received view that the
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conception of god is derived from or evolved from reflections
on spirits and ghosts of ancestors.
Lang makes it clear that he is dealing with probable
explanations, but he is intent on challenging what he
considers to be a dogmatic presentation and discussion of
the origins of religion which overlooks or ignores available
evidence. If his two arguments can be sustained, the
standard view, even if supported by leading scholars, will
have to be reconsidered. Lang acknowledges that his first
thesis goes against the grain of contemporary scientific and
materialistic views and that he can at best provide a
probable explanation of the data. But he argues that his two
theses are independent of each other and that even if the
first is rejected as improbable, the second, based on
evidence of a different kind, might still be maintained.
Lang is careful to say that reports of supernormal
experiences should not be accepted without careful analysis.
He believes, however, that Tylor and other anthropologists
reject such reports out of hand and in violation of
procedures followed in anthropological studies. Usually
anthropologists follow the test of the recurrence of similar
reports in different and unrelated places and ages as a
means for judging the value of the evidence. In his study
Lang collects stories of primitive beliefs about visions,
hallucinations and so on which are associated with claims to
knowledge not obtainable through normal channels of sense
knowledge. He then compares these with similar stories among
living and highly educated peoples. In this way he proposes
to study what he calls the X region of human nature, the
region of miracles, prophecy and visions which is associated
with the major religions and major religious leaders.
Lang argues, for example, that clairvoyance or what the
Zulus call "opening the gates of distance" is widely
reported in diverse cultures and ages and that this ability
to have knowledge of events remote to the knower is
attributed to many, including many saints. We may not be
able to confirm or deny primitive explanations of such
experiences in terms of wandering spirits. But we might be
able to understand how primitive man arrived at such beliefs
or explanations and how he might have found confirmation for
such beliefs in other supernormal experiences. Further,
argues Lang, if we cannot totally discount reports of
clairvoyance which have been sifted through a well educated
and modern intelligence we are in no position to dismiss
primitive data out of hand just because it conflicts with
the prevailing theory of materialism. Indeed such experiences
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may provide evidence that the idea of the spiritual is
rooted in actual experiences and that the materialistic
account of man and world is less than adequate.
Lang's second and perhaps more important argument
addresses the question of the origins of the ideas of the
gods. On the standard account, the idea of ghosts arises
from dreams and visions. From this, based on erroneous
reasoning, man is said to have developed the ideas of higher
spirits, then gods, then higher gods and finally the belief
that there exists only one supreme god. On this account
primitive tribes had no belief in a supreme being or higher
god. The idea of god was a later development evolving from
nature spirits and the culture of ancestor worship. Lang
challenges this view of Tylor, HuxleY,Spencer and others.
Based on his study of several primitive and remote
cultures,Lang argues that the conception of a supreme moral
being occurs in societies where ancestor worship does not
occur and that some of these societies are as monotheistic as
the Christian societies.
To develop his point, Lang examines in some detail
several religions of the most remote and primitive races,
those least contaminated by Judaeo-Christian or Islamic
teaching. Among the Fuegians, for example, Lang reports the
concept of a magnified, non-natural man, who walks about in
the woods and mountains, who knows every word and action,
who cannot be escaped and who influences the weather in
accordance with man's conduct. His moral standard is much
above that of the ordinary person and he cannot be explained
as a deified chief because in Fuegian society one person is
not superior to another. Herbert Spencer refers to this "big
man" as a deceased weather doctor, but Lang argues that
there is no evidence of his ever dying. Further, says Lang,
we cannot explain this idea by reference to ancestor worship
because there is no evidence of such among the Fuegians. In
these and other cases argues Lang, it is difficult to find
evidence to support the standard anthropological view that
the conception of a supreme moral being developed from the
idea of the ghost of an ancestor.
According to Lang, although we do not find among the
most primitive peoples an abstract monotheistic conception
of god, there is evidence of belief in a super creative,
powerful and moral being.
Further this belief is often
found in juxtaposition with belief in worshipped ghosts,
totems and fetisches. He recognizes, however, that in some
higher forms of material culture the belief in a supreme
moral being is displaced by mobs of ghosts and spirits who
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attract persons' adoration, who help persons, who often are
selfish and cruel and who respond to sacrifices including
human sacrifices. Lang calls this a degeneration of
religion, an explanation which is foreign to the standard
view because on that view the moral element in primitive
religion is not acknowledged.
If there is, as Lang suggests, a degeneration from a
higher moral form of religion, how can this be explained?
According to Lang, animism, once developed, created a
powerful attraction for natural or sinful man. The supreme
moral being does not favor one person or tribe over another
and cannot be tempted to do so as a reward for gifts and
sacrifices. Thus men and women went in search of useful
ghost-gods and fetisches which would respond to their
particular wants and desires. As a result, the higher meral
god was neglected or came to be thought of as one deity
among others. Myth making, itself an irrational activity and
a product of animism according to Lang, is part of this
process of setting aside the more noble religious ideas of
primitive persons.
Material culture continued to develop during this period
of the degeneration of religion but now the fortunes of the
state and a rich and powerful clergy were bound up with the
continuation of animism and the relatively non-moral systems
in Greece and Rome. According to Lang, it would take the
moral monotheism of Islam or Judaism to overcome this
degeneration of religion. Just how far these traditions
moved from animism is suggested in the Biblical prophet's
saying, "Even though he slay me, yet will I trust in him."
In Christianity, says Lang, we find a combination of the
ideas of caring for the good of the soul and man's eternal
responsibilities with the idea of the righteous and eternal
god of the prophets of Israel.
Lang's approach to the Gifford Lectures followed the
relatively new and still emerging social scientific method
of investigation and he was criticized by some religious
leaders for paying insufficient attention to religious
doctrines. However in general his studies of natural
religion were believed to lend support to traditional
theology. The response to Max Muller's Gifford Lectures at
Glasgow University was in many cases quite different, as we
shall see. Muller, the German born Oxford philologist, had
been a candidate for the first Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh
University when J.H. Stirling was elected. Shortly after
Stirling was elected to that post Milller wrote to a friend
that Stirling, a bona fide student of philosophy would tell
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what natural religion would or could be or should have been.
MUller, however, thought that the time for this was past and
that the focus should now be on what religion has been.
Shortly after the Edinburgh decision had been announced,
Muller received a letter
from Principal Caird inviting him
to give the lectures at Glasgow.
Friedrich Max MUller was born in the town of Dessau in
1823. 4
He was sent to the famous Nicholas School of Leipzig
in 1836 and began his studies as a classical scholar at the
University of Leipzig in 1841. At Leipzig Muller was
attracted to the study of philosophy and attended lectures
of Christian Weisse and Rudolf Hermann Lotze and considered
himself something of a Hegelian at the time. Following his
doctoral thesis on Spinoza, Muller went to Berlin University
where he was attracted by the work of the then elderly
idealist philosopher, Schelling, who was lecturing on the
philosophy and mythology of religion. From these thinkers
Muller learned to think of the Bible as a historical text to
be treated in accordance with the same critical principles
that were used in studying other ancient books including the
sacred texts of the East.
Having become convinced of the importance of the
Rig-veda to the study of all mythological and religious
theories, MUller went to Paris to attend Burnour's lectures
and to begin to copy and collate the manuscripts of the Veda
and its commentaries. His interests in these texts and his
study of Sanskrit coincided with a rising western interest
in India. But Muller's interest in language was controlled
by a philosophical thesis, that the study of language would
help understand the prehistory of the human mind and the
intellectual connections among the many peoples of the world.
Subsequent to a trip to the East India House in England
to collate some manuscripts, the East India Company
entrusted to Muller the publication of the Rig-veda. Mliller
settled in Oxford to do this work while lecturing on modern
literature and language, devoting his leisure time to the
study of philology. By the time of his Gifford Lectures
Muller dominated much of the work being done in the history
of religions. In the published version of his first series of
Gifford Lectures, Natural Religion, Muller says that he will
bring to the topic of natural theology the newest of the
sciences, the science of religion. He describes this as a
science which consists in a careful collation of the facts
of religion, a comparison of religion in terms of their
likenesses and differences, and an effort to discover the
nature, origin and purpose of religion.
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Muller's approach to the origins of religion is rooted
in his understanding of what he called the science of
language. In this approach we take languages as we find
them, trace them back to their earliest forms, classify them
and then analyze them until we arrive at root elements which
can be analyzed no further. These root elements form for
MUller the ultimate facts on which the study of religions is
based. Then in tracing the development of words, we discover
stages where meanings evolve leading through mythology to
religion. Using this method MUller attempts to discover what
is peculiar to each religion and what is common to all with
the conviction that what is common to all constitutes the
essence of religion.
Muller delayed his second course of lectures until
February 1890 and following these lectures he was elected to
a second two courses of lectures. These lectures were
published under the titles, Physical Religion (1891),
Anthropological Religion (1892), and Psychological Religion
(1903). Natural Religion was understood to be of an
introductory nature and fell into three divisions: (1) The
definition of natural religion (2) The method for studying
natural religion (3) The material available for studying
natural religion. The first lectures then can be seen as a
prologomena to the future lectures. In Physical Religion
MUller studies different names derived from nature to refer
to what lies beyond the limits of nature. Anthropological
Religion is concerned with evidence of the superhuman in
relation to parents and ancestors. And Psychological
Religion is concerned with the sense of otherness or beyond
associated with experiences of the self. In this essay our
focus is primarily on Muller's first set of Gifford Lectures.
The first task in Natural Religion is that of
determining what can be called religion. Muller was
convinced that religious knowledge like all knowledge was
rooted in sensations. Even Kant who had defended the place
of pure reason over against the tendencies of Locke and
Hume, had argued that apart from sensation all concepts
would be empty. Knowledge, according to MUller, had to be
understood in terms of sensations, precepts, concepts and
names, four distinguishable albeit not separable phases of
knowledge. In thinking we deal with names which embody our
concepts but our concepts are rooted in percepts and our
percepts in sensation. In this way Muller aligned himself
with the empiricists of the age. According to Muller this
process belongs to the early stage of development of the
human mind as well as to our own thinking. Thus in learning
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language, in learning the names of things, we are part of a
cumulative history. Through language we are linked to the
past.
One characteristic is said to be in common in all our
percepts and hence in all our concepts and names. Our
percepts refer to definite or finite objects and this is the
case whether we are referring to material objects, to other
persons or to ourselves as self-conscious beings. Implicit
in this sense of finiteness, however, is a sense of the
beyond or the infinite, a feeling of the beyond in the
presence of the finite object. This sense of the beyond is
said to be the most primitive and fertile source of our
mythological and religious ideas but only over time did it
emerge as the concept of the Infinite or Supreme Being.
When, for example, the early Vedic poet praised the dawn, he
did not have in mind the later abstract concept of Infinite
Being, but he did intend to refer to something beyond the
definite object dawn, to refer to something within or behind
the dawn which reappeared day after day. In a related way,
primitive man sensed a beyond or an otherness in other
persons, call it breath, spirit or mind, and this led to the
worship of deceased ancestors. And with reference to selfconsciousness, there was a sense of the infinite which was
expressed in terms of spirit or soul, an independent agent
of power. In nature, man and self, then, we find references
to the infinite and each of these is said to contribute to
the development of what is called religion.
In the fuller sense, however, religion is said to
consist "jn the perception of the infinite under such
manifestations as are able to influence the moral character
of men." s
Contrary to the findings of Lang, Muller did not
believe that religion in this sense could be found among
primitive peoples. But he did hold that to the extent that
mythology gets beyond the mere naming of powers and begins
to speak of promise and sacrifice, it is on the threshold of
religion. To the extent that limen begin to feel constrained
to do what they do not like to do, or to abstain from what
they would like to do, for the sake of some unknown powers
which they have discovered behind the storm and the sky, or
the sun or the moon, they are at least on religious
ground."6
If this is what is meant by religion, how are we to
study it? Natural theology understood as an effort to
establish logical arguments for the existence of God had on
Muller's view been discredited by critics. Muller believed
with John Caird that at best the traditional arguments
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demonstrated an implicit logic of religion tracing the steps
by which the mind rises to consciousness of god. But MUller
adds to this what he calls a logic of facts or a logic of
history where one can show the mind to rise gradually and
irresistably to the idea of god in the history of religion.
"The true object of the Historical School," he wrote, "is to
connect the present with the past, to interpret the present
by the past, and to discover if possible the solution of our
present difficulties by tracing them back to the causes from
which they arose."7
Language, mythology, customs and laws and the Sacred
Books of the religions are the resources for the study of
this history. But language, the words in which our concepts
and hence our precepts and sensations are expressed,
provides for Muller the fundamental key. A study of words
shows that our primitive relation to the world was not one
of a subject standing over against an object. Words were
originally deeds, creative acts calling into life concepts
that did not previously exist. Initially man spoke of the
consciousness of his own action. He might speak of himself
as a striker or a digger and other beings like himself were
spoken of in comparable ways. Animals were also treated as
actions. Thus the word, horse, meant quick runner and the
word, mouse, a thief. This relation to animals is preserved
in animal fables. The word for river meant running here and
the word for tree meant splitting here. In this so-called
dynamic or dramatic stage in the development of language
argues Miiller, we find the key to animism. When persons
wished to speak of what we would call objects, they did so
in terms of the action roots of language. What we today
think of as objects set over against us were first named in
action language and in time things were talked about by
analogy with human action and took on personal forms.
Myth, argues Muller, stands second only to language as a
resource for studying the origins of religion and myth is
said to be an inevitable stage in the development of
language. The original meaning of the word, dawn, for
example, was shining there, and the early formers of
language would speak of dawn fleeing, wakening, sleeping and
so on. Here we have the inevitable development of myth.
Since dawn is followed by the sun, the sun becomes the
follower, the lover, the daughter or perhaps even a veiled
bride if she appeared in the clouds. Through such examples
we can understand the emergence of myth but can also
understand how myth may contain the germ of religion. The
dawn may be said to be always the same, always returning,
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never dying, immortal. And once described as immortal dawn
may take on other religious attributes.
Language, then, may be said to lead to myth and from
myth to religion. And the study of the roots of language
helps us to identify and compare the different deities. This
is done by tracing the origins of the names of various
deities to see whether or not they originate in the same
name. Muller was looking for the most scientific or exact
way of studying the origins of religion and he believed that
it is the name alone which gives continuity through the
centuries, enables one to distinguish one deity from another
and allows one to relate the mythological and religous
ideas of cultures otherwise far distant from each other.
In studying the language and myths as well as the
customs, laws and Sacred Books of the religions we learn that
religion is not created de-novo, that religion is part of a
long historical process. Just as laws existed before codes
of laws, so religion existed before Sacred Books. This,
according to Muller, is forgotten or overlooked when codes,
laws or Sacred Books become fetisches requiring absolute
obedience. Historical or revealed religions rest on the
foundation of natural religon and the failure to recognize
this is said to be one of the principal reasons for the kind
of aggressive unbelief which attacks religion from all
sides.
MUller's first lectures were well attended and the
audience included students, faculty, ministers and persons
from the community. The Glasgow student paper spoke highly
of his lectures and the invitation to give a second two year
course of lectures is an indication of faculty support for
his work. Although one critic complained that Muller had
found something good in every religion except Christianity,
there was little public outcry against Muller's first set of
lectures. As time went on, however, animosity from some of
the Churches increased and he was accused by some ministers
at a meeting of the Established Presbytery of Glasgow of
spreading pantheistic and infidel views. Although Muller was
for the most part defended by the scholars and the
newspapers, the criticism was significant enough that Muller
wrote a defence of his position in the Preface to the third
volume of his lectures. That defence focused primarily on
the question of his attitude toward the miraculous.
At Edinburgh, the first Gifford Lecturer was J.
Hutchison Stirling. That he was invited to be a Gifford
Lecturer was itself symbolic of an important change that was
taking place in British philosophy during the last quarter
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of the nineteenth century. In the 1877 edition of Recent
British Philosophy, first published in 1865, David Masson
wrote the following:
On the whole, my impression is that the
struggle in Systematic British Philosophy, apart from
Didactic Theology, is not now any longer, as it was in
1865, between Hamilton's System of Transcendental
Realism plus a Metaphysical Agnosticism relieved by
strenuous faith, and Mill's System of Empirical
Idealism plus a Metaphysical Agnosticism, relieved by
a slight reserve of possibility for Paley after all,
but between Mr. Spencer's Philosophy of a Real and
Knowable Cosmical Evolution blocked off from an
Unknowable Absolute, and some less organized
Idealistic Philosophy,described as British Hegelianism. s
Until the second half of the nineteenth century, Hegel was
all but unknown to philosophers in Britain. German Idealism
first began to make its appearance through the literary
works of Coleridge, Emerson and Carlyle. And there was a
group of younger philosophers and theologians growing up in
the 1850s and 1860s that was unattracted to either the
rigid orthodoxies of the Churches or the empirical and
agnostic philosophies of the day. For many of these, the
literary works of the idealists provided sustenance. Stirling
was one of the earlier of these persons who would help bring
about the kind of Neo-Hegelianism that would flourish
particularly at the University of Glasgow and Balliol
College, Oxford in the 1880s and I 890s. This movement would
also spread quickly to the United States.
Stirling, born in Glasgow in 1820, never held a
University position. 9
He was a candidate for the Chair of
Moral Philosophy at Glasgow in 1866 when Edward Caird, a
Scotsman trained at Balliol College was appointed. Caird was
fifteen years younger than Stirling and did not yet have an
established reputation. But he would become in time the most
important of the Scottish Neo-Hegelians. Stirling was a
candidate for a similar post at Edinburgh in 1868 and had the
support of Carlyle and Emerson, but again he was
unsuccessfuL Stirling had written to John Stuart Mill
requesting a testimonial for the positon at Edinburgh, but
Mill, who spoke well of Stirling's work on Hegel, declined to
support him on the grounds that he did not "think the study
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of Hegel would have a salutary effect on the 'immature minds
of university students' .,,10
Stirling had taken his first degree at Glasgow where he
won first prize in moral philosophy. But he was little
motivated by the Scottish Common Sense Tradition which
informed the work of his teacher, Fleming. In 1842 Stirling
graduated from the College of Surgeons at Edinburgh
University and for some years practiced as a surgeon in
Wales. During this period he wrote a number of poems and
essays which showed among other things his great admiration
and sympathy for the work of Carlyle. At the death of his
father in 1851, Stirling inherited a sum sufficient to
enable him and his family to live completely without
employment. He took advantage of this to study at the
Sorbo nne and in 1856 he and his family moved to
Heidelberg where he studied the German language and began to
read with care the works of HegeL It would be nine years
before he published The Secret of Hegel but from the
beginning Stirling was attracted to Hegel's effort to
reconcile philosophy and Christianity.
Stirling and his family returned to London in 1857 and
three years later moved to Edinburgh where he spent his
remaining years. The publication in 1865 of his two volume
work, The Secret of Hegel, being the Hegelian System in
Origin, Principle, Form and Matter, established Stirling's
reputation and is said by many to have marked the beginning
of serious study of Hegel in Great Britain. Although some
critics said that if Stirling knew the secret of Hegel, he
had been successful in keeping it to himself, the book was
praised by a leading Hegelian, Edward Caird, who wrote that
"Hegel was first introduced in the powerful statement of his
principles by Dr. Hutchison Stirling."n
In The Secret,
Stirling suggests that Hegel's distinction between
Vorstellungen and Begriffe provides a way forward from crude
superstitions in religion on the one hand and the critics of
the Enlightenment on the other hand. And this theme is
echoed in Stirling's Gifford Lectures published in 1890 as
Philosophy and Theology.
By contrast with Lang and MUller, Stirling seems
reluctant to stray very far from the traditional
understanding of natural theology. Theology, Stirling
suggests, may be considered to be the logos of God where we
mean something like a description, narrative or theory of
God. A natural theology should seek to provide a narrative
or description of God independent of that which is given

41

42

Eugene Thomas Long

expressly in revelation. Stirling suggests, however, that if
we look to treatises on the subject of natural theology we
discover "that the attempt in all of them is to demonstrate
the existence and attributes of the Deity by reason alone,
in application to nature itself as it appears within us or
He admits that natural theology understood
without US."12
as a consideration of the arguments for the existence of God
has for some years been set aside and he admits that one who
takes them up again runs the risk of being regarded as a
fossil. But he suggests that little attention has been given
to the historical development of the traditional arguments
and that a treatment of the arguments in the context of
their history would conform to the expectations of Lord
Gifford and avoid an exercise that is merely antiquated.
Stirling spends much effort in the Gifford Lectures
tracing the historical development of the arguments for the
existence of God and criticisms of these arguments. It may
be said with some justification that the emphasis on
historical development is itself a Hegelian emphasis and
that Stirling challenges the tendency in much philosophy of
the time to separate problems under discussion from an
understanding of the past. But little can be gained here
from reviewing that history. Of more importance for our
purposes is the suggestion of a new attitude or approach to
the relation between philosophy and theology.
Stirling describes himself as a member of the National
Church of Scotland, but he distinguishes between the Broad
Church which emphasizes religious understanding, the High
Church which emphasizes religious feeling and the low or
Evangelical Church which attempts to unite understanding and
feeling. Although he identifies himself with the low Church
view, he abhores the tendency of each division to be
intolerant of the other. The essential difference between his
and the several church views, says Stirling, is that the
churches possess what is called Vorstellungen or
representations and he Begri//e or concepts. "What they have
positively in the feeling or positively in the understanding
or positively in the union of both, I have reflectively, or
ideally, or speculatively in reason."13 To put this in other
terms Stirling argued that the ordinary faithful thought in
terms of crude pictures and figurative representations,
often distorted by error and prejudice but that he through
reason sought to bring the figurative expressions of faith
to clearer expression and to lay a philosophical foundation
for them. This theme would be taken up by several later
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Gifford Lecturers standing in the Neo-Hegelian tradition,
particularly John and Edward Caird.
By reason, Stirling did not mean to refer to mere
intellectual understanding in the Enlightenment sense. The
Aufkltirung as expressed in the writings of Hobbes, Voltaire,
Hume and others had tended to dominate discussions of
religion and was generally critical of it. Enlightenment
thinkers called into question symbolic representations of
religious faith, but failed, according to Stirling, to see
the truth behind them. Mere intellectual understanding has
to do only with the conditional and the finite and anything
beyond that is negated or left in the dimension of the
unknowable. But reason in Hegel's and Stirling's sense refers
to a speculative effort to bring differences into relation
and to think the unconditioned and the infinite.
Many philosophers, according to Stirling, had given up
Enlightenment attitudes and approaches one hundred years
earlier, but that so-called advanced form of thinking had
been taken over in recent years by the general population
and every hamlet had its Tom Paine. Stirling was anxious to
overcome the separation between finite and infinite, secular
and religious, and feeling and understanding that was
associated with the Enlightenment. Hegel's understanding of
reason and thought pointed the way forward for him. Stirling
described his own position as philosophical Christianity and
said that this was a view which he could hold even if he
occupied a Christian pulpit.
Response to Stirling's lectures was somewhat mixed. The
lecture halls were filled to capacity and a reviewer of the
published version
of the lecturers said in Expository Times
that this was one of the most suggestive volumes on the
relation between philosophy and theology that had ever
appeared in Scotland. By contrast a reviewer in Mind, while
acknowledging that Stirling said many notable and well
pointed things, commented that as a whole the lectures
suffer the sin of irrelevance. Stirling's lectures would
have been more notable, one suspects, had he chosen to
develop in more detail what he called philosophical
Christianity.
At the time there were those who said that Hegelianism
was an exotic interest outside the mainstream of Scottish
philosophy and predicted that it would have a short life.
This prediction, however, is not supported by the data.
Whether one argues that Hegel and Idealism in general are
outside the mainstream of Scottish philosophy or with
Pringle-Pattison that it is in many ways consisitent with
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traditional Scottish philosophy, it is clear that the
Neo-Hegelians were an important force in Scottish philosophy
and natural theology through the last two decades of the
nineteenth century and that Idealism in a broader sense was
very influential in Scottish natural theology at least
through the first half of the twentieth century.14
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